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Regulatory Competition and Forbearance

Michael K. McShaneLarry A. CoxRichard J. Butler

其他書名	Evidence from the Life Insurance Industry
出版	SSRN, 2011
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=RbDdzwEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋Regulatory separation theory indicates that a system with multiple regulators leads to less forbearance and limits producer gains while a model of banking regulation developed by Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2006) predicts the opposite. Fragmented regulation of the US life insurance industry provides an especially rich environment for testing the effects of regulatory competition. We find positive relations between regulatory competition and profitability measures for this industry, which is consistent with the Dell'Ariccia and Marquez model. Our results have practical implications for the debate over federal versus state regulation of insurance and financial services in the US.