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The DNA of Constitutional Justice in Latin America
Daniel M. BrinksAbby Blass
其他書名
Politics, Governance, and Judicial Design
出版Cambridge University Press, 2018-04-19
主題Law / GeneralLaw / ConstitutionalLaw / Judicial PowerPolitical Science / General
ISBN11071783639781107178366
URLhttp://books.google.com.hk/books?id=RkFPDwAAQBAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
EBookSAMPLE
註釋Cover -- Half Title -- Series page -- Title page -- Imprints page -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Constitutional Justice in the Americas at the Turn of the Millennium -- 1.1. Recent Trends in the Design of Constitutional Justice Systems -- 1.2. Constitutional Governance Theory in a Nutshell -- 1.3. Constitutional Ferment in 19 Latin American Countries, 1975-2009 -- 1.4. Contributions -- 1.5. Looking Ahead -- 2 Judicial Power and the Design of Constitutional Justice -- 2.1. Understanding and Measuring Judicial Power -- 2.2. Disaggregating Judicial Power -- 2.2.1. Autonomy -- 2.2.2. Authority -- 2.2.3. Interacting Autonomy and Authority -- 2.3. Uneven Growth of Judicial Power in Latin America -- 2.3.1. Using the Quantitative Measure to Describe the Region -- 2.3.2. Qualitative Overview of Regional Trends -- 2.3.3. Individual Countries -- 2.4. Correlation or Causation: Do Formal Institutions Matter? -- 2.5. Conclusion -- 3 Constitutional Governance and the Politics of Judicial Design -- 3.1. Putting Existing Theories on the Same Plane -- 3.2. A Unifying Theory: Courts as Mechanisms of Constitutional Governance -- 3.3. Principles of Design for Constitutional Governance -- 3.4. Alternative Logics -- 3.4.1. Diffusion of Regional and Period Models -- 3.4.2. Learning -- 3.4.3. Regime-Specific Logics (Legitimacy) -- 3.5. Conclusion -- 4 Identifying the Political Origins of Constitutional Justice through Quantitative Analysis -- 4.1. From Theory to Hypotheses to Operationalization -- 4.1.1. First Principle: The Ruling Coalition and the Scope of Authority -- 4.1.2. Second Principle: The Originating Coalition and the Constitutional Governance Coalition -- 4.2. Alternative Explanations -- 4.2.1. Testing for Learning -- 4.2.2. Testing for Diffusion -- 4.2.3. Testing for Authoritarian Preferences -- 4.3. Results