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Tying the Autocrat's Hands
Yuhua Wang
出版Cambridge University Press, 2015
主題Law / GeneralLaw / Administrative Law & Regulatory PracticeLaw / JurisprudencePolitical Science / GeneralPolitical Science / Comparative PoliticsPolitical Science / History & TheoryPolitical Science / Political Process / GeneralPolitical Science / Political FreedomPolitical Science / Political Ideologies / GeneralPolitical Science / World / AsianPolitical Science / Corruption & Misconduct
ISBN11070717479781107071742
URLhttp://books.google.com.hk/books?id=RsWTBQAAQBAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
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註釋Under what conditions would authoritarian rulers be interested in the rule of law? What type of rule of law exists in authoritarian regimes? How do authoritarian rulers promote the rule of law without threatening their grip on power? Tying the Autocrat's Hands answers these questions by examining legal reforms in China. Yuhua Wang develops a demand-side theory arguing that authoritarian rulers will respect the rule of law when they need the cooperation of organized interest groups that control valuable and mobile assets but are not politically connected. He also defines the rule of law that exists in authoritarian regimes as a partial form of the rule of law, in which judicial fairness is respected in the commercial realm but not in the political realm. Tying the Autocrat's Hands demonstrates that the rule of law is better enforced in regions with a large number of foreign investors but less so in regions heavily invested in by Chinese investors.