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Entrepreneurship, Asymmetric Information and Unemployment

Robin BoadwayMarianne VigneaultMaurice MarchandNicolas Marceau

出版	SSRN, 2008
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=SDjazwEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

We examine how three sources of asymmetric information affect the supply of entrepreneurs and unemployment. In the first case, banks cannot observe entrepreneurs' risk of failure, so they ration credit. This increases the number of entrepreneurs and the level of unemployment. In the second case, firms cannot observe workers' effort, so they offer a wage above the market clearing one. This results in unemployment and too few entrepreneurs. The final case arises when firms cannot observe workers' abilities. A pooling wage is offered and results in too many entrepreneurs. The role of government in restoring efficiency is explored.