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Intelligence-driven Computer Network Defense Informed by Analysis of Adversary Campaigns and Intrusion Kill Chains

Eric M. HutchinsMichael J. CloppertRohan M. Amin

出版	Lockheed Martin Corporation, 2010
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=Ti6dswEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋Conventional network defense tools such as intrusion detection systems and anti-virus focus on the vulnerability component of risk, and traditional incident response methodology presupposes a successful intrusion. An evolution in the goals and sophistication of computer network intrusions has rendered these approaches insufficient for certain actors. A new class of threats, appropriately dubbed the "Advanced Persistent Threat" (APT), represents well-resourced and trained adversaries that conduct multi-year intrusion campaigns targeting highly sensitive economic, proprietary, or national security information. These adversaries accomplish their goals using advanced tools and techniques designed to defeat most conventional computer network defense mechanisms. Network defense techniques which leverage knowledge about these adversaries can create an intelligence feedback loop, enabling defenders to establish a state of information superiority which decreases the adversary's likelihood of success with each subsequent intrusion attempt. Using a kill chain model to describe phases of intrusions, mapping adversary kill chain indicators to defender courses of action, identifying patterns that link individual intrusions into broader campaigns, and understanding the iterative nature of intelligence gathering form the basis of intelligence-driven computer network defense (CND).