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Credible Commitment to Optimal Escape from a Liquidity Trap
Mr.Olivier JeanneMr.Lars E. O. Svensson
其他書名
The Role of the Balance Sheet of an Independent Central Bank
出版International Monetary Fund, 2004-09-01
主題Business & Economics / Banks & BankingBusiness & Economics / Foreign ExchangeBusiness & Economics / Finance / General
ISBN145185790X9781451857900
URLhttp://books.google.com.hk/books?id=Ul0YEAAAQBAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
EBookSAMPLE
註釋An independent central bank can manage its balance sheet and its capital so as to commit itself to a depreciation of its currency and an exchange rate peg. This way, the central bank can implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, which involves a commitment to higher future inflation. This commitment mechanism works even though, realistically, the central bank cannot commit itself to a particular future money supply. It supports the feasibility of Svensson's Foolproof Way to escape from a liquidity trap.