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Asymmetric Attention

Alexandre Kohlhas

出版	SSRN, 2018
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=UsoBzwEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

We document simultaneous over- and under-responses to new information by households, firms, and professional forecasters in survey data. Such behavior is inconsistent with existing theories based on either behavioral bias or rational inattention. We develop a structural model of information choice in which people base expectations on observables that can reconcile the seemingly contradictory facts. We show that optimally-chosen, asymmetric attention to different observables can explain the co-existence of over- and under-responses. We then embed our model of information choice into a micro-founded macroeconomic model, which generates expectations consistent with the survey data. We demonstrate that our model creates over-optimistic consumption beliefs in booms and predictability in consumption changes.