登入選單

返回Google圖書搜尋

Dynamic Coalition Formation in Markets with Linear Demand

Winston D. Hurst

出版	Brigham Young University, 2016
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=V4mRswEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

This thesis presents a gradient play differential game in a producer market with linear demand as a model of behavior in a competitive environment. This model is then extended to allow for cooperation. Definitions of coalitions and natural coalitions are provided, and previous work dealing with static coalition structure is presented. Requirements for acceptable system dynamics are given, and a specific set of dynamics presented. These dynamics are shown to meet the specified requirements in a number of cases through proofs of stability of equilibria as well as guarantees that the dynamics result in natural coalitions. Numerical examples are provided to support the claim that a reasonable equilibrium exists and that its basin of attraction covers reasonable initial conditions. The work concludes with a summary as well as possible paths for continued research.