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Evidence and Verification in Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic

Sean Foley

出版	Philosophy)--Catholic University of America. 2023., 2023
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=VMhS0AEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

This thesis explicates Edmund Husserl's concept of "evidence [Evidenz]" as it is presented in his most mature logical work, Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929). In contrast to most scholarship on evidence, which treats it as the highest achievement of the thinking subject, this thesis emphasizes the process of evidence and the many distinctions that Husserl draws with respect to its possibility and results. The first chapter highlights several themes in Husserl's general discussion of evidence in FTL II.1, including the logical character of evidence and its relation to pre-predicative experience, its normativity with respect to other performances, and the different types of evidence that correspond to different types of objectivities. The second chapter focuses on FTL I.1, in which Husserl clarifies the internal structure of logic by distinguishing between three modes of judging: judging vaguely, distinctly, and clearly. Judging distinctly and clearly are shown to be different types of evidence, each correlated with a different type of objectivity. The third chapter treats FTL I.4, which distinguishes logic from mathematics through a clarification of the objectivities correlated with clear and distinct evidence. Husserl shows that both distinct and clear evidence are essential to scientific verification, and he clarifies the sense and the relation between their respective objectivities through his description of verification. This allows Husserl to draw a fundamental distinction between the respective domains of formal ontology and formal apophantics-the formal study of beings and the formal study of judgments as such. Logic studies the ontological domain, but pure mathematics only studies the apophantic domain.