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Some Simple Models of Arms Races

Michael D. Intriligator

出版	Rand Corporation, 1964
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=W8oqAAAAMAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

The study simplifies the complex structure of arms races in the real world by the assumption of two contenders, each having one policy variable: weapons stocks. With these simplifications, arms races are studied by means of reaction curves that indicate optimal weapons stocks, given the weapons stocks of the opponent. Both classical models are extended to allow for either a deterrent or an arms depriving strategy and constraints on weapons stocks. Strategic factors lead to stable points of mutual deterrence or explosive regions in which one side can disarm its opponent and the opponent cannot deter. Constraints lead to a high level equilibrium if both sides pursue an arms depriving strategy. If both sides then know the constraint of the opponent, a low level of weapons holdings would exist, guaranteeing for both the same desirable property of the high level equilibrium: both sides are prevented from attaining the capability to disarm the opponent. The analysis is suggestive only; it does not consider the many dimensions of policy. (Author).