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Google圖書搜尋
Citizens, Autocrats, and Plotters
Ricardo Sanhueza
Alexander Galetovic
其他書名
A Model and New Evidence on Coups D'Etat
出版
SSRN
, 2000
URL
http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=WWfhzwEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
註釋
We present a model of coups in autocracies. Assuming that policy choices cannot be observed but are correlated with the short-run performance of the economy we find that: (a) the threat of a coup disciplines autocrats; (b) coups are more likely in recessions; (c) increasing per capita income has an ambiguous effect on the probability of a coup. The implications of the model are consistent with the evidence. On average, one recession in the previous year increases the probability of a coup attempt by 47 percent. By contrast, the effect of the level of per capita income is weak.