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When Economic Value Backfires

其他書名	Domestic Opposition to Resource-Rich Territory
出版	SSRN, 2023
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=XIQv0AEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋Do economic resources make a territory more desirable for conquest? I argue that contrary to conventional wisdom, certain types of economic resources can make states less willing to claim a territory. The presence of capital-intensive resources in a territory, such as oil or minerals, raises concerns about how the benefits of acquiring the territory would be distributed within the nation. These distributional concerns invite stronger opposition from various domestic groups who would not directly benefit, making it harder and costlier for leaders to mobilize support over acquiring economically valuable lands. Using original geocoded data of territorial claims in South America from 1830-2001, I show that states are indeed less likely to claim lands with capital-intensive natural resources. I then illustrate the theoretical mechanism through a case study of Bolivia, comparing Bolivian attitudes toward its two lost provinces of the Chaco and the Litoral. By showing how the presence of economic value can become a liability in mobilizing unified support for conflict, this paper questions the widespread assumption that economic resources make territories more appealing to fight over.