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Long-term Competition in a Dynamic Game
出版Rand Corporation, 1984
URLhttp://books.google.com.hk/books?id=Y4HsAAAAMAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
註釋This paper extends the analysis of cooperative equilibria of the Levhari-Mirman example by using methods developed for repeated games to study equilibria which Pareto-dominate the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Levhari-Miram. The term Cold War reflects the fact that such cooperative behavior is supported by threats which are not carried out. The first section summarizes the repeated game tools and the results obtained with them. The next section contains the Levhari-Mirman example, and characterizes the cooperative equilibrium outcomes. The third section describes a sufficient condition for subgame perfection of an equilibrium outcome and demonstrates that backwards induction optimality is not implied by perfection, and that there are many desireable perfect equilibria that cannot be constructed by backwards induction. The fourth section describes the perfect equilibria in the nonrenewable or exhaustible resource case. The last section contains a discussion of some limitations and possible extensions.