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Dynamics in Executive Labor Markets

其他書名	CEO Effects, Executive-firm Matching, and Rent Sharing
出版	Ohio State University, 2006
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=bhn0jwEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋Abstract: Previous empirical efforts to examine the link between CEOs and firm performance using variance decomposition suffer from methodological problems that systematically understate the relative impact of CEOs on firm performance compared to industry and firm effects. The percentage of the variance in firm performance explained by heterogeneity in CEOs is re-examined with methodological refinements addressing this prior literature. The re-estimated "CEO effect" on corporate-parent performance is found to be substantially more important than that of industry and firm effects, but only moderately more important than industry and firm effects on business-segment performance. Despite the importance of CEOs in influencing firm performance, much debate surrounds the observed heterogeneity in executive compensation practices across firms and industries. Two broad explanations of this heterogeneity are explored: differences between firms-"where you work" and differences between executives-"who you are". Results suggest that "where you work" is more important than "who you are" in determining executive compensation differentials. Why some firms would systematically pay above market wages while other firms would systemically pay below market wages is furthered explored. Both labor market "sorting" and rent-sharing are found to account for firm effects on wage differentials among executives.