登入選單
返回Google圖書搜尋
Learning Large Lessons
註釋The roles of ground and air power have shifted in U.S. post-Cold War warfighting operations. Furthermore, the two services largely responsible for promulgating the relevant doctrines, creating effective organizations, and procuring equipment for the changing conflict environment in the domains of land and air -- the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force -- do not appear to be fully incorporating the lessons of post-Cold War operations. Indeed, the Army and the Air Force (and the other services) have tended to view the conflicts of the post-Cold War period through their specific institutional prisms. Additionally, all the U.S. military services have focused the vast majority of their attention on warfighting, to the exclusion of other types of military operations (e.g., Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)) that are increasingly central to achieving national security objectives. These mind-sets must change if the U.S. Armed Forces are to provide the capabilities most needed to protect and advance national interests in the future. Although the period since the end of the Cold War has witnessed a significant number of MOOTW, the "war" dimension of the range of military operations is where the Army and the Air Force have generally focused their institutional efforts, which are reflected in their doctrines, organizations, and equipment. Consequently, this study analyzed the following post-Cold War conflicts: Iraq (1991), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003). The analysis was limited to identifying the responses of the ground-centric and the air-centric communities to what happened in these wars and, where appropriate, a more integrated assessment of these wars.