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Security Design in OTC Markets
出版National Bureau of Economic Research, 2019
URLhttp://books.google.com.hk/books?id=bjqrzQEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
註釋Abstract: We study security issuers' decision whether to pool assets when facing counterparties endowed with market power, as is common in over-the-counter markets. Unlike in competitive markets, pooling assets may be suboptimal in the presence of market power - both privately and socially - in particular, when the potential gains from trade are large. In these cases, pooling assets reduces the elasticity of trade volume in the relevant part of the payoff distribution, exacerbating inefficient rationing associated with the exercise of market power. Our results shed light on recently observed time-variation in the prevalence of pooling in financial markets