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Cooperation in the Commons

Stephen PolaskyNori TaruiGregory M. EllisCharles F. Mason

出版	SSRN, 2011
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=btnfzwEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

This paper delineates circumstances in which a first-best cooperative solution can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium in a dynamic common property renewable resource game. In a game with nonlinear resource stock effects on cost, we characterize a worst perfect equilibrium that supports cooperation for the widest range of parameter values for the discount rate, resource growth rate, harvest price, and the number of resource exploiters. The strategy profile that we propose is consistent with human behavior observed in experiments and common property resource case studies.