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'What is it Like' Talk

其他書名	What it is Like
出版	Australian National University, 2014
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=bz7N0AEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋This thesis develops a new way of understanding the language we use when characterising (phenomenally) conscious states, which allows us to get clearer about what these states are. Paradigm examples of conscious states are tasting garlic, feeling nauseous, and suffering toothache. L-talk is the use of L-sentences: sentences which involve L-phrases such as 'what is it like' and 'something it is like'. Phenomenal L-talk--the use of L-sentences to talk about consciousness--is ubiquitous in philosophy of mind. It is used to give the standard definition of conscious states: a state is conscious if and only if there is something it is like for the subject of the state to be in that state. L-talk is also used to state theses, give arguments, and, more generally, to talk about consciousness. These definitions, claims and arguments are of limited value if we do not understand the language--the L-phrases--we use to express them. But it is not clear how we should understand L-talk: there is disagreement about whether such talk is meaningful, what (if it is meaningful) it means, and how it has whatever meaning it has. Further, although it is often overlooked, we also see non-phenomenal L-talk: the use of L-phrases to talk about things other than consciousness. For example, 'What was it like for the car to be driven across the desert?' does not ask about conscious states, but about, say, damage done to the car. My thesis offers an account of L-talk which tells us what L-talk means, how it works, and how there can be both phenomenal and non-phenomenal L-talk. I show that L-talk is meaningful, and that it is concerned with properties, not comparisons. I also argue that the difference between phenomenal and non-phenomenal L-talk is not that one involves technical terms, idioms, or metaphors while the other does not. Nor is that it is contextual factors that differentiate the two types of L-talk. Instead I demonstrate that much L-talk involves ellipsis: there is more to many L-sentences than is articulated. Thus a question such as 'What is it like to taste garlic?' is more clearly stated as 'What is it like phor you for you to taste garlic?' It is the presence of the phenomenal for (which I spell 'phor' for clarity) which ensures that this question is an instance of phenomenal L-talk: it asks about your conscious states. I explain the meaning of 'phor' with reference to that of non-epistemic uses of 'appear' words, such as 'appear', 'feel', and 'seem'. Having explained and argued for my account of L-talk, I put the account to work. First, I clarify, improve and defend the standard definition of conscious states given above. Then I consider a linguistic argument--one which depends on a claim about the meaning of L-talk--for the conclusion that to be in a conscious state is to be aware of that state. I show that the argument does not succeed.