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Google圖書搜尋
Career Incentives and Corruption
César Martinelli
Naila C. Sebastián Esandi
其他書名
A Lab Experiment
出版
SSRN
, 2022
URL
http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=cAnfzwEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
註釋
We propose a model of political career incentives and corruption, and take it to the lab. As predicted by the model, moral incentives and the desire for reelection interact to refrain politicians from taking bribes in the early stage of their careers. Treatments with weaker reelection incentives do worse in terms of inducing good initial behavior of politicians, but may do better in terms of inducing good behavior at a later stage. The probability of voters' mistakes and, possibly, the distribution of moral motivations seem to vary with the treatment, with strategic behavior being apparently more common in environments with perfect information about politicians' actions.
