返回Google圖書搜尋

Social Preferences in the Public Arena

其他書名	Evidence from a Prisoner's Dilemma Game on a TV Show
出版	SSRN, 2011
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=cUbVzgEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋We analyze a large stakes prisoner's dilemma game played on a TV show. Players cooperate 40% of the time, demonstrating that social preferences are important; however, cooperation is significantly below the 50% threshold that is required for inequity aversion to sustain cooperation. Women cooperate significantly more than men, while players who have earned more of the stake cooperate less. A player's promise to cooperate is also a good predictor of his decision. Surprisingly, a player's probability of cooperation is unrelated to the opponent's characteristics or promise. We argue that inequity aversion alone cannot adequately explain these results; reputational concerns in a public setting might be more important.