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Holdup in Oligopsonistic Labour Markets

其他書名	A New Role for the Minimum Wage
出版	IZA, 2006
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=d2aanQEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋"We consider a labour market model of oligopsonistic wage competition and show that there is a holdup problem although workers do not have any bargaining power. When a firm invests more, it pays a higher wage in order to attract workers from competitors. Because workers participate in the returns on investment while only firms bear the costs, investment is inefficiently low. A binding minimum wage can achieve the first--best level of investment, both in the short run for a given number of firms and in the long run when the number of firms is endogenous"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.