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Bank Supervision Russian Style

其他書名	Rules Versus Enforcement and Tacit Objectives
出版	SSRN, 2007
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=dCnZzgEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋We focus on the conflict between two central bank objectives - individual bank stability and systemic stability - and the regulatory forbearance that follows from it. We study the licensing policy of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) during 1999-2002. Banks in highly concentrated bank markets, large banks, and banks that are active on the interbank market enjoy protection from license withdrawal, which suggests a tacit concern for systemic stability. The CBR is also found reluctant to withdraw licenses from large deposit banks as this conflicts with the tacit CBR objective to secure depositor confidence and systemic stability.