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The Manual Wargaming Process
註釋This monograph analyzes the manual wargaming portion of the U.S. Army's decision-making cycle in order to determine if the process deduces the optimum course of action. The monograph begins by examining game theory, which is the theoretical basis for wargaming. This examination establishes that game theory provides two theoretical models for decision-making, one based upon enemy capabilities and the other on enemy intentions. The analysis continues by examining the historical development of wargaming and its incorporation as a decision-making tool. Using theory-based criteria, the monograph reviews current American, German, British, and Soviet war gaming methods at the division level. The three criteria analyze how well a methodology provides a rational opponent, considers friendly and enemy intentions, and uses rational control or rules. The monograph concludes that the current U.S. wargaming method does not give us the optimum solution, largely because it is difficult to discover enemy intentions before a decision is made by the friendly commander. If a friendly commander knew what the enemy's intentions were, he would choose the appropriate course of action to counter it. However, since the commander can only base his decision on enemy capabilities--or what his enemy can (vice will) do--his course of action choice becomes merely a 'best guess.' The monograph then suggests remedies to bring us closer to an optimum course of action.