登入
選單
返回
Google圖書搜尋
Spying in Bertrand Markets Under Incomplete Information
Cuihong Fan
Byoung Jun
Elmar G. Wolfstetter
其他書名
Who Benefits and Is It Stable?
出版
SSRN
, 2022
URL
http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=drHfzwEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
註釋
We analyze spying out a rival's price in a general duopoly model with differentiated prod- ucts where payoff functions are strictly supermodular and firms are subject to incomplete information about costs. Spying has two effects: it induces a sequential game and eliminates the spying firm's uncertainty. In sharp contrast to the case of complete information, spying does not benefit both firms: it adversely affects the spied-at firm if its cost is low and may expose the spying firm to a negative value of information. We decompose the impact of spy- ing into its sequential moves effect and its information effect and find conditions for profitable espionage. We also show that the spied-at firm cannot benefit from bypassing the spy if its cost is low by delaying its pricing decision (or firing the spy) because this would trigger a devastating cascade of belief changes.
