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Verification of Disarmament by Inspection: a Game Theoretic Model

Morton D. Davis

出版	Defense Technical Information Center, 1962
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=eSpqHAAACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

The problem is to determine the proper behavior of two parties to a disarmament agreemenc: one, the inspector attempting to either inhibit evasion or to maximize the probability of detecting any evasion should it occur, the other, an evader or possible evader, attempting to evaluation the possible gains from evasion, the possible losses in being caught evading, and thus deciding whether to evade or not, and if deciding to evade how to do so with the least chance of being caught. The model is a simplification of reality with an assumption that the evader has decided to evade and has but to choose the ''proper'' manner. As an input to such decisions, it isimportant to know the consequences of evading, so that the problems considered, logically precede the ones ignored. The model has an inspector and evader with diammetrically opposed interests, trying to raise and lower, the probability of detecting evasions, respectively. In the terminology of Game Theory, this is a zero-sum game. (Author).