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Incentives and Institutions

其他書名	A Bottom-Up Approach to Climate Policy
出版	SSRN, 2012
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=gMrhzwEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋This paper comments and assesses "Fragmented Carbon Markets and Reluctant Nations: Implications for the Design of Effective Architectures," a paper that David Victor presented at the international workshop on Architectures for Agreement: Addressing Global Climate Change in the Post-Kyoto World, organized by Joe Aldy and Rob Stavins at the J.F. Kennedy School of Government in May 2006. By analyzing Victor's proposals for an effective climate agreement post 2012, this paper emphasizes the contribution that game-theoretical analyses have provided to the design of climate agreements. It therefore emphasizes how incentives and institutions play a crucial role in affecting the final outcome of negotiations on climate change control, and how incentives and institutions can be modified to achieve a better control of climate change. This paper also discusses a wider policy approach that can enhance the effectiveness of measures designed to address the climate change problem.