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Anti-Pragmatism
Albert Schinz
其他書名
An Examination Into the Respective Rights of Intellectual Aristocracy and Social Democracy
出版CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015-12-27
主題History / GeneralPhilosophy / Movements / Pragmatism
ISBN15229498609781522949862
URLhttp://books.google.com.hk/books?id=gy5JjwEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
註釋The Monist has published an analysis of the French edition of this book, in the July number, 1909, pp. 474-475. Its author, now Associate Professor of French Literature in Bryn Mawr College, was formerly "Professeur agrégé de philosophic" at the University of Neuchatel. The English edition contains some new features: (1) A "warning" in which the author asks his readers to remember that he does not attack a pragmatic conception of life, but only a pragmatic philosophy. (2) The author has taken the trouble in many cases to refer to other philosophers who simultaneously with him had addressed objections to pragmatists similar to his own (e. g., Bakewell, Carus, Creighton, Hibben, etc.) and to emphasize the unanimity of critics on both sides of the ocean. (3) In an Appendix: "Answer to Various Criticisms," Mr. Schinz begins by exposing the comfortable argument of silence so profusely used by pragmatists. They have been accused repeatedly of ignoring the criticisms directed against them by simply declaring that others did not understand them, or refusing to see the real point at issue. They say that pragmatism is not subjectivism, but they do not prove it. All their opponents agree on that point; therefore Mr. Schinz asks whether it is not perhaps "the pragmatists who refuse to see the point at issue." Mr. Schiller (in Mind) has protested against the dilemma of the author of Anti-Pragmatism, viz., either pragmatism recognizes the rights of reason, and then it is not different from any philosophy; or it does not recognize those rights, then it has a right to the claim of being a new philosophy, but because it is irrational-is false. Mr. Schinz maintains his position by new quotations from Schiller's books. Mr. Schinz replies to those who accuse him of considering pragmatism as a low sort of utilitarianism. He also meets the question of Naville of Geneva: If science is bad morally for the masses, why should it not be bad for the intellectual aristocracy also? Finally to those who tell him that his viewpoint is not anti-pragmatic but hyper-pragmatic (Paulhan, Compayre, Faguet, Schiller) the author says that for him pragmatism as a social doctrine is not bad, but philosophically it is false. We find that truth is morally bad; why then should we not, for the benefit of humanity, preach something better, which is not true? For pragmatists good and true agree; for Mr. Schinz they do not.