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Does Deposit Insurance Diminish Market Discipline

其他書名	Evidence from Bulgaria
出版	2012
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=hQv3mgEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋As a consequence of the run on the British bank Northern Rock, the European Parliament's Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee agreed on raising the deposit insurance coverage from 20,000 to 50,000 Euro as of 30 June 2009 to restore confidence among depositors in the banking system. In this thesis the differences-in-differences methodology is employed to find out whether the implementation of this rise of coverage limit in Bulgaria diminished market discipline. The results suggest that holders of deposits in domestic currency reduced their efforts to discipline banks subsequently to the rise of the deposit insurance coverage in November 2008, while the holders of Euro-deposits increased their efforts. Holders of Euro-deposits impose more discipline on banks after November 2008 due to the failure of the Lehman Brothers and to bailouts of large banks in the United States of America and Europe. The former event made depositors more aware of bank risk taking and the latter event made them more conscious of potential too-big-to-fail guarantees. These events also impact holders of domestic currency deposits, but in a less pronounced manner. A reasonable explanation for behavioral discrepancies between holders of domestic currency and holders of Euro-deposits could be the lower level of education of domestic-currency holders.