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The Executive Compensation Puzzle
Todd T. Milbourn
其他書名
Theory and Evidence
出版
SSRN
, 1998
URL
http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=hUDPzgEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
註釋
I develop a theory of compensation contracts for the chief executive officers (CEOs) of firms and confront the theoretical predictions with CEO compensation data. My model has the following aspects: a board of directors that behaves strategically in designing the CEO's compensation contract, a financial market in which there are informed investors whose information is noisily incorporated into prices, and a Bayesian belief revision mechanism by which the CEO's past performance impacts his reputation. The theory predicts that the pay-for-performance sensitivity for the CEO is an increasing function of his perceived ability and the liquidity of the financial market.I then confront these cross-sectional predictions with CEO compensation data for the years 1987 to 1994. Using equity-based proxies for CEO reputation, I document a positive relationship between the pay-for-performance sensitivity and a CEO?s reputation. I also document a positive relationship between the pay-for-performance sensitivity and the measure of informed traders as proxied by the firm?s adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread.