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Incentives for Dishonesty

其他書名	An Experimental Study with Internal Auditors
出版	SSRN, 2017
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=hiz7zgEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋We conduct an experiment with professional internal auditors and evaluate their performance and objectivity, measured as the extent to which they truthfully report the performance of other participants in a real-effort task. It has been suggested in the literature that incentive-based compensation for auditors has the potential to lead to dishonest behavior, for instance when their payoff depends on the performance of the unit they are auditing. In line with our hypotheses, we find that incentive-based compensation increases dishonest behavior among internal auditors: competitive incentives lead to under-reporting of other participants' performance, while collective incentives lead to over-reporting of performance. In addition, we find that moving from an environment with objective performance evaluation towards a peer evaluation scheme reduces performance.