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註釋Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience appears virtually upon the five-year anniversary of my appointment as Inspector General in Iraq. Shortly after that appointment, I met with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, to whom I reported, to discuss the mission. His first words were: Why did you take this job? It is an impossible task. I began to understand why he offered so startling a welcome during the following week, when I made my first trip to Iraq to begin setting up oversight of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), then in charge of Iraq's reconstruction. My office in the Republican Palace, which housed the CPA and would later house the U.S. Embassy was adjacent to the CPA Comptroller's. What I saw was troubling: large amounts of cash moving quickly out the door. Later that same day, walking the halls of the palace, I overheard someone say: We can't do that anymore. There is a new inspector general here. These red flags were the first signs of how challenging executing oversight in Iraq would be. But it has not been impossible, chiefly because of the professional, productive, and courageous conduct of the many auditors, inspectors, and investigators who have worked diligently to fulfill the mission of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). SIGIR's oversight jurisdiction covers about $50 billion in U.S. funds appropriated by the Congress for Iraq the largest relief and reconstruction effort for one country in U.S. history. This sea of taxpayer dollars flowed to a wide spectrum of initiatives, ranging from training Iraq's army and police to building large electrical, oil, and water projects; from supporting democracy-building efforts to strengthening budget execution by provincial councils; and from funding rule-of-law reforms to ensuring that the Iraqi government sustains what the U.S. program provided.