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Product Development with Lurking Patentees

出版	SSRN, 2022
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=j6HczwEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋We analyze technology investment and adoption by a product developer who faces uncertainty over whether any existing patent covers a new technology. If there is a patent, the (non-producing) patentee may choose to “lurk”--i.e., to strategically delay enforcement--hoping that the developer will adopt the patented technology and unwittingly accumulate infringement liability. Lurking incentives are pervasive and strongest at intermediate levels of patent strength and damages. We identify when there is inefficiency relating to adoption or investment and find that lurking does not usually deter developers from efficient technology adoption. Ignoring the impact of lurking on the developer's strategic choices about technology adoption and investment can misguide economic predictions and policy conclusions.