登入
選單
返回
Google圖書搜尋
A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality
Mr.Olivier Jeanne
Mr.Jonathan David Ostry
Mr.Jeronimo Zettelmeyer
出版
International Monetary Fund
, 2008-10-01
主題
Business & Economics / Finance / Financial Risk Management
Business & Economics / Finance / General
Political Science / Political Economy
ISBN
1451870949
9781451870947
URL
http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=jFN-0AEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
註釋
We present a framework that clarifies the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and the conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise. In the model, traditional conditionality commits country authorities to undertake crisis resolution efforts, facilitating the return of private capital, and ensuring repayment to the IMF. Nonetheless, moral hazard can arise if there are crisis externalities across countries (contagion) or if country authorities discount crisis costs too much relative to the national social optimum, or both. Moral hazard can be avoided by making IMF lending conditional on crisis prevention efforts-"ex ante" conditionality.