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Tax Avoidance and Vertical Interlocks Within Multinational Enterprises

Henning GieseReinald KochMarkus Gamm

出版	Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre, 2022
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=jd8_zwEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

This study investigates to what extent multinational enterprises appoint managers jointly at the headquarter and a foreign subsidiary (vertical manager interlocks, VMIs) in order to facilitate tax planning. We use a cross-section data set taken from the AMADEUS database to show that VMIs are observed more frequently in MNEs with a higher potential for tax-induced profit shifting. We also provide evidence indicating that the implementation of VMIs is motivated by an internal principal-agent conflict arising from conflicting interests between the MNE and high-tax subsidiary managers. Finally, we show that the use of VMI structures is associated, ceteris paribus, with a lower effective tax rate.