註釋 This unique and informative paper was produced by the National Intelligence University / National Defense Intelligence College. This updated and revised edition of an earlier, classified publication is an excellent primer for both intelligence analysts and policymakers. Events have shown that accurate and timely warning has most often been produced by a minority viewpoint brought to the attention of decisionmakers in some way; it is not the product of a majority consensus. In an era of asymmetric warfare in which our national security and wellbeing can be seriously threatened by hostile groups as well as nations, it is imperative that lessons from the past not be forgotten but be brought up to date and the discipline of warning reinvigorated. Warning intelligence differs significantly from current intelligence and the preparation of long-range estimates. It accepts the presumption of surprise and incomplete intelligence and requires exhaustive research upon which to build the case for specific warning. Relationships among events or involving the players may not be readily evident at first and initial signs often consist of fragmentary evidence, conflicting reports, or an absence of something. It is not merely a compilation of facts. It is an abstraction, an intangible, a perception or a belief. While a specific methodology for developing warning may have been tailored to the needs of the Cold War, the same principles apply even to asymmetric conflict. In the rush to build new intelligence mechanisms to combat terrorist attacks and to provide warning for the homeland as well as for forces deployed, the nation and the Intelligence Community would be well served by reviewing this book to gain an understanding of what constitutes warning and how it is arrived at. As the author points out, "warning does not exist until it has been conveyed to the policymaker, and ...he must know that he has been warned." All intelligence professionals and key policymakers must understand the principles outlined in this very relevant publication. Topics and subjects: Factors influencing Warning; warning intelligence; analytical method; political and military factors for warning; surprise and timing; deception; inference; induction; deduction; strategic versus tactical; indicator lists; long-term warning files; logistical preparations; DEFCON status; Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 1968; Cuban Missile Crisis 1962; Korean War; World War II; Six-day war; Vietnam War; cover plans or cover stories. Chapter 1 * The Role of Warning Intelligence * General Nature of the Problem * What Is Warning? * Intentions versus Capabilities * Chapter 2 * Introduction to the Analytical Method * Indicator Lists: Compiling Indications * Fundamentals of Indications Analysis * Specifics of the Analytical Method * Chapter 3 * Military Indications and Warning * The Nature of Military Indicators * Order-of-Battle Analysis in Crisis Situations * Logistics is the Queen of Battles * Other Factors In Combat Preparations * Chapter 4 * Political Factors for Warning * Ambiguity of Political Indicators * A Problem of Perception * Considerations in Political Warning * Chapter 5 * Warning from the Totality of Evidence * The Relative Weight of Political and Military Factors * Isolating the Critical Facts and Indications * Some Guidelines for Assessing the Meaning of Evidence * Reconstructing the Adversary's Decisionmaking Process * Chapter 6 * Surprise and Timing * Principal Factors in Timing and Surprise * Examples of Assessing Timing * Warning is Not a Forecast of Imminence * Chapter 7 * The Problem of Deception * Infrequency and Neglect of Deception * Principles, Techniques and Effectiveness of Deception * Types of Deception * What Can We Do About It? * Chapter 8 * Judgments and Policy * Facts Don't "Speak For Themselves'' * What Do Top Consumers Need, and Want, to Know? * Intelligence in Support of Policy? Assessing Probabilities 