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A Model of Sovereign Debt in Democracies

Ali Alichi

出版	International Monetary Fund, 2008-06-01
主題	Business & Economics / Insurance / GeneralBusiness & Economics / Public FinanceBusiness & Economics / Industries / Financial Services
ISBN	14518701089781451870107
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=k74lAQAAMAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

This paper develops and empirically tests a political economy model of sovereign debt. The main incentive for repaying sovereign debt is to maintain access to international capital markets. However, in a democracy, one generation may choose default regardless of its consequences for future generations. An old generation with little concern for its country's access to capital markets can force a default on debt if it has the majority of voters. On the other hand, if the younger generation is more numerous, it can force repayment of previously defaulted debt. Other voter heterogeneities, such as in income, can generate similar results.