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Performance Incentives and Planning Under Uncertainty

Gregory G. HildebrandtLaura D'Andrea Tyson

出版	Dean of the Faculty, United States Air Force Academy, 1976
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=mBTyAAAAMAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

The report discusses the use of the performance incentive function (PIF) by planning organizations when there is subjective or objective uncertainty. It is proved that a PIF can be constructed which achieves both allocational and distributional optimality, when there is subjective uncertainty about the conditions of production and both the center and the producer are risk averse. When there is objective uncertainty, however, it is shown that it is not, in general, possible for the center to achieve these two objectives simultaneously.