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Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design

Emir Kamenica

出版	SSRN, 2019
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=maDgzwEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

A school may improve its students' job outcomes if it issues only coarse grades. Google can reduce congestion on roads by giving drivers noisy information about the state of traffic. A social planner might raise everyone's welfare by providing only partial information about solvency of banks. All of this can happen even when everyone is fully rational and understands the data-generating process. Each of these examples raises questions of what is the (socially or privately) optimal information that should be revealed. In this article, I review the literature that answers such questions.