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The Rise and Fall of National Security Decisionmaking in the Former USSR
註釋The demise of the Soviet state has dramatically focused attention on the consequences of the collapse of the unified decision making system that controlled the old Soviet military institution. This report seeks to provide a benchmark for what has been lost with the disappearance of that central political-military mechanism, and thus to help illuminate the choices facing the new, post-Soviet institution-builders. To this end, the report uses fragmentary past evidence and many revelations of recent years to sketch the evolution of the Soviet national security decision making system from its earliest days through the dramatic changes of the Gorbachev era. The bulk of the discussion concerns two key central institutions of the old Soviet regime: the Defense Council and the leadership's commission for coordination of arms control decisions. The study traces the factors that progressively undermined these institutions in the last years of the Soviet regime. It explains how the despair of those in the military-industrial complex who had traditionally dominated this system prior to its collapse helped trigger the August 1991 abortive attempt at a coup, whose failure in turn precipitated the final downfall of the Soviet state. During the months leading up to the August coup, the leaders of the military-industrial complex discovered that the centrifugal process in the USSR steadily whittled away at their traditional ability to use central institutions to carry out unilateral decisions affecting the republics, and that a prominent motive for the coup was the hope of halting that process by preventing the imminent signing of a union treaty that would formalize a vast further reduction in the degree of influence those leaders enjoyed. The report concludes by examining the issues confronted by the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the individual republics in dealing with the heritage of the old decision making system.