登入
選單
返回
Google圖書搜尋
Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes
Francesco Decarolis
Leonardo M. Giuffrida
Elisabetta Iossa
Vincenzo Mollisi
Giancarlo Spagnolo
出版
ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
, 2020
URL
http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=myymzQEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
註釋
To what extent does a more competent public bureaucracy contribute to better economic outcomes? We address this question in the context of the US federal procurement of services and works, by combining contract-level data on procurement performance and bureau-level data on competence and workforce characteristics. We use the death occurrences of specific types of employees as instruments and find that an increase in bureau competence causes a significant and economically important reduction in: i) time delays, ii) cost overruns, and iii) number of renegotiations. Cooperation within the office appears to be a key driver of the findings.
