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Mergers in Fiscal Federalism
Marie-Laure Breuillé
Skerdilajda Zanaj
出版
Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
, 2010
URL
http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=n733xwEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
註釋
This paper analyzes mergers of regions in a two-tier setting with both horizontal and vertical tax competition. The merger of regions induces three e.ects on regional and local tax policies, which are transmitted both horizontally and vertically: i) an alleviation of tax competition at the regional level, ii) a rise in the regional tax base, and iii) a larger internalization of tax externalities generated by cities. It is shown that the merger of regions increases regional tax rates while decreasing local tax rates. This Nash equilibrium with mergers is then compared with the Nash equilibrium with coalitions of regions