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Do Banks Time Bond Issuance to Trigger Disclosure, Due Diligence, and Investor Scrutiny?

Daniel M. Covitz

出版	SSRN, 2004
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=nsHtzgEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

This paper tests a new hypothesis that bank managers issue public debt, at least in part, to convey positive, private information and refrain from issuance to hide negative, private information. This positive selection hypothesis is tested against the traditional adverse selection hypothesis. We find evidence for positive selection, using ratings migrations, equity returns, bond issuance, and balance sheet data for U.S. bank holding companies. The results add to our understanding of market discipline in monitoring bank holding companies and also inform upon how proposed regulatory requirements that banking organizations frequently issue public debt might augment market discipline.