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Thomas Kuhn and Perspectival Realism

Ryan J. O'Loughlin

出版	Ohio University, 2017
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=ohmrswEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

In this paper I discuss Giere's reading of Kuhn as affirming perspectival realism and I present evidence demonstrating that this reading of Kuhn is correct. I consider several scientific realist theses that Kuhn rejects and discuss whether and to what extent perspectival realism may be regarded as a scientific realist position. I suggest adding Kuhn's account of incommensurability, understood in its later form, to Giere's account of perspectival realism. I conclude by providing a definition of perspectival realism that incorporates Kuhn's incommensurability thesis as well as the specific claims of scientific realism that are compatible with perspectival realism. Perspectival realism thus understood is, at most, a weak form of scientific realism.