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Anchored Strategic Reasoning
Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel
Gyula Seres
出版
Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190
, 2022
URL
http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=otw0zwEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
註釋
Anchoring is a robust behavioral phenomenon modeled predominantly as a bias in individual judgment. We propose a game-theoretic model that considers players' beliefs about others' behavior as a mediator for the effect of the anchor on a player's choice. The results establish that anchoring in strategic interactions reported in the literature can be rationalized by anchored beliefs about the opponents' intentions. Notwithstanding, we also demonstrate that a player might adjust away from rather than toward the anchor in games where choices are strategic substitutes.