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Credibility of Central Bank Independence Revisited
Mr.Timo Valila
出版International Monetary Fund, 1999-01-01
主題Business & Economics / InflationBusiness & Economics / Banks & BankingBusiness & Economics / Public Finance
ISBN14518417449781451841749
URLhttp://books.google.com.hk/books?id=pE0YEAAAQBAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api
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註釋The specific role of central bank independence in determining the overall credibility of monetary policy is addressed in this paper. It is argued that the credibility of delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank is endogenous to the credibility of the inflation target because a “conservative” inflation target may not be compatible with the fiscal policy stance. Also, lack of transparency in designing the institutional set-up is shown to be welfare-reducing.