登入選單

返回Google圖書搜尋

Lending Relationships and the Collateral Channel

Gareth AndersonSaleem BahajMatthieu ChavazAngus FoulisGabor Pinter

出版	CFM, Centre for Macroeconomics, 2018
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=pv_GzQEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

This paper shows that lending relationships insulate corporate investment from fluctuations in collateral values. We construct a novel database covering the banking relationships of private and public UK firms and their individual directors. The sensitivity of corporate investment to changes in real estate collateral values is halved when the relationship between a bank and a firm or its board of directors increases by 11 years. The importance of long bank-firm relationships diminishes when directors have personal mortgage relationships with their firm's lender. Our findings support theories where collateral and private information are substitutes in mitigating credit frictions over the cycle.