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Relative Capture

其他書名	Quasi-Experimental Evidence from the Chinese Judiciary
出版	SSRN, 2017
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=r7z6zgEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋Ever since the Federalist Papers, there has been a common view that the lower the level of government, the greater is the extent of capture by vested interests. Relying on the analytical framework of relative capture, I challenge this view by arguing that interest groups have different incentives and capacities to capture different levels of government. I test the theory by investigating how judges at different judicial levels adjudicate corporate lawsuits in China. Exploiting a quasi-experiment in which the Supreme People's Court dramatically raised the threshold for entering higher-level courts in 2008, I report evidence that while privately owned enterprises are more likely to win in lower-level courts, state-owned enterprises are more likely to win in higher-level courts. These results are robust to a variety of tests, and I rely on qualitative interviews to explore the mechanisms. The findings challenge an underlying assumption in the decentralization literature and have important policy implications for countries that are trapped in centralization/decentralization cycles.