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Real Effects of Disclosure Regulation

其他書名	Evidence from U.S. Import Competition
出版	University of Rochester, 2021
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=rDPTzwEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋"This paper investigates the impact of disclosure regulation on import competition. Using the segment disclosure regulation (SFAS 131) as a plausibly exogenous shock that increases available information about U.S. product markets, I document an increase in U.S. import competition at the industry level. Consistent with foreign firms strategically responding to the increase in disclosures, the effect is stronger when foreign competitors have a greater comparative advantage and incentive to compete with U.S. firms, especially among foreign competitors from developing economies. Additional tests show that the effect is stronger when foreign competitors have a lower cost to acquire U.S. firms' mandatory disclosures and a greater ability to understand the corresponding information, suggesting interfirm learning from disclosures is likely the channel. To further understand how import competition increases, I show that the increase is not only from products already imported to the U.S. before the regulation, but also from the entry of new products. Finally, I provide evidence that the segment disclosure regulation generates negative spillover effects on the performance and investment of U.S. firms through its direct impact on import competition"--Page vii.