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Kripke's Language Puzzle and Heidegger's Puzzling Language

Sean Donovan Driscoll

出版	Brigham Young University, 2013
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=rIXooQEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋

In this thesis, I engage the problem of why substitution of coreferential names in intensional contexts seems plausible but leads to contradictions. After delineating the background of the problem, I focus on Saul Kripke's formulation in his "A Puzzle About Belief." Therein, because proper names do not seem to behave the same in all intensional contexts as they do in modal contexts, and because discussing the content of propositions in contexts yields contradictions, Kripke concludes that there must be an inadequacy in our current understanding of belief attribution. Consequently, Kripke is able to produce a puzzle for which there may be no solution. I argue that this situation does not result from belief attribution, but from a more fundamental step in the puzzle's formulation. However, I further Kripke's conclusion by showing how Martin Heidegger's philosophy can indicate the essential reduction causing Kripke's paradox. As such, Heidegger's thinking about deliberately oblique language actually confirms that the puzzle will remain a puzzle. Thus, because the many solutions that have been proposed to Kripke's puzzle engage language after that reduction, they ultimately cannot succeed.