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Due Diligence, Research Joint Ventures, and Incentives to Innovate

出版	SSRN, 2011
URL	http://books.google.com.hk/books?id=slzizwEACAAJ&hl=&source=gbs_api

註釋The decision to cooperate within R&D joint ventures is often based on `expert advice.' Such advice typically originates in a due diligence process, which assesses the R&D joint venture's profitability, for example, by appraising the achievability of synergies. We show that if the experts who advise the owners considering forming an R&D joint venture are also responsible for R&D efforts, they can have incentives to withhold information about the extent of those synergies. Owners optimally react by reducing the incentives to innovate in low-value projects developed within R&D joint ventures and in high-value projects developed within competing research organizations.